In a context where the global oil industry is rapidly evolving, with the gradual withdrawal of international majors, the question of state-owned oil companies taking charge of national projects is becoming increasingly pressing. In Senegal, the Yakaar-Teranga gas field, one of the most promising in the sedimentary basin, is at the heart of this debate: should PETROSEN, the national hydrocarbon company, take on the role of operator? This decision could redefine the country's energy sovereignty, but it raises complex technical, financial and strategic issues.
The implications of PETROSEN's role as operator
Becoming an operator would mean that PETROSEN would take direct responsibility for the exploration, development and production of the Yakaar-Teranga field. This would involve assuming full technical, financial and environmental responsibility for the project. The advantages are clear: strengthening internal expertise and greater control over national resources. As industry experts point out, this development would enable PETROSEN to capitalise on the commitment and qualifications of its engineers, who have already demonstrated their expertise in the past.
As a reminder, PETROSEN operated the Thiès licence between 1995 and 1998, drilling the Gadiaga-2 well after acquiring nearly 750 km of onshore seismic lines. This historic experience proves that the national company has a solid foundation on which to build a more central role. In the current industry landscape, marked by the withdrawal of the majors, national companies such as PETROSEN must position themselves as operators to prevent entire basins from remaining unexplored.
However, Yakaar-Teranga presents specific challenges. Located in deep waters (deep offshore), this gas field faces complex reservoir geology, which must be resolved before a viable development concept can be defined. Becoming an operator in such a context would require advanced technical expertise and substantial financial capacity, potentially beyond PETROSEN's immediate resources. Some in the industry believe that this project is not ideal as a first step as an independent operator, recommending instead available shallow offshore blocks or heavy oil deposits such as those in the Gea and Flore domes, which have been made economically viable by new technologies.
The joint venture alternative: balancing ambition and caution
Rather than a total takeover, a joint venture with an experienced partner could offer a more balanced approach. This approach would enable PETROSEN to develop its skills while limiting operational and financial risks through measurable technology transfer. National companies such as Petronas (Malaysia), Petrobras (Brazil), Gazprom (Russia) and Sinopec (China) are cited as ideal potential partners, capable of providing expertise and capital without excessively diluting national interests.
According to analysts, the real question is not simply whether PETROSEN should become an operator, but when and how. The goal remains achievable, but it must be part of a gradual strategy in which national interests take precedence. In existing projects such as GTA (Grand Tortue Ahmeyim), operated by BP and Woodside Energy, PETROSEN is already positioning itself as a key partner. These major companies act as clients, financing and supervising operations by outsourcing specialised services (e.g. to Halliburton for drilling). This client-supplier model gives PETROSEN leverage to impose strict local content clauses, promoting economic development and the creation of sustainable jobs in Senegal.
International lessons: NOC operator vs joint venture
Globally, national oil companies (NOCs) now control ~90% of the world's reserves. Some countries have chosen to make their NOCs the main operator (strong sovereignty model), while others prefer to start with a joint venture to manage risks. Several key examples illustrate these trajectories:
- Brazil/Malaysia – NOCs as "local champions" : The cases of Petrobras (Brazil) and Petronas (Malaysia) show that a state can develop an internal champion capable of managing large deposits. According to Bain (2011), these two NOCs generate annual revenues of approximately $140 billion and $75 billion, respectively, and have significantly boosted their local industries. For example, in 2010, Brazil passed a law giving Petrobras the role of exclusive operator in the giant pre-salt field (with a minimum 30% local participation). However, these models require huge investments in capital and technical training, which Senegal must bear in mind.
- Gradual steps (Ghana, Equatorial Guinea) : Several African NOCs are making steady progress. Ghana's GNPC has set itself a "five-year" plan to become a joint operator, followed by ~15 years to become a full operator. Similarly, Equatorial Guinea's NOC GEPetrol will become the operator of Block B (Zafiro field) in 2024, but will rely on a technical assistance contract with Petrofac to immediately benefit from international expertise. These examples show that a supervised partnership (which may include technical bonding) is often chosen initially, allowing for a gradual transfer of skills to the NOC.
- Financial prudence (example: Nigeria) : The Nigerian experience illustrates the risks when the state is solely responsible for the project. In Nigeria, the NNPC holds a 60% stake in onshore joint ventures with the majors. In 2016, the NNPC was unable to meet its capital calls (arrears ~$2.5 billion), causing production to fall from 1 Mb/d to ~0.8 Mb/d. This precedent argues in favour of Petrosen very carefully assessing its financing capacity before becoming the sole operator. Moreover, a Senegalese analysis points out that Petrosen "will probably depend on its partners... to contribute to the majority of development costs and to the operation of the project." In other words, at least for the time being, a solid joint venture remains necessary.
- "Local content" effect When the NOC assumes the role of operator, this can stimulate the national economy. Bain highlights the "Petrobras effect": the share of local content in Brazilian upstream/downstream projects exceeds 70% thanks to Petrobras' proactive policy. Becoming an operator would enable Petrosen to replicate this leverage by mobilising Senegalese industries and suppliers. However, to achieve this, it will be essential to maintain high technical standards and attract appropriate financing (as its Malaysian counterparts have done with international bonds and partnerships).
These factors call for a nuanced debate: energy sovereignty (a national power struggle) may require a strong local operator, but experience shows that gradually acquiring expertise and sharing risks often pays off in the long term.
Financing: a national priority with international options
Funding for the Yakaar-Teranga field is emerging as a top priority for Senegal. Observers emphasise the role of PETROSEN as the spearhead of the project, taking on the role of "sales representative" to structure a consortium of investors and mobilise the necessary capital. If local financing is slow to materialise, it is imperative to actively seek foreign partnerships. The stakes are enormous: the development of Yakaar-Teranga could boost economic growth, generate skilled jobs and strengthen the country's energy sovereignty.
Towards greater energy sovereignty
Ultimately, the debate over PETROSEN's role as operator for Yakaar-Teranga transcends technical aspects and touches on Senegal's strategic vision for hydrocarbons. With the National Local Content Monitoring Committee (CNSCL), the African Refining Company (SAR), the Senegalese Gas Network (RGS) and Petrosen Trading & Services, PETROSEN already has the tools it needs to maximise local benefits. A cautious approach, combining partnerships and gradual skills development, seems the most appropriate way to transform resources into sustainable opportunities. One thing is certain: the skills of Senegalese engineers and PETROSEN's commitment make this goal not only achievable, but essential for the country's future.